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On the Simulatability Condition in Key
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Abstract
Simulatability condition is a fundamental concept in studying key generation over a non-authenticated
public channel, in which Eve is active and can intercept, modify and falsify messages exchanged over the
non-authenticated public channel. Using this condition, Maurer and Wolf showed a remarkable “all or
nothing” result: if the simulatability condition does not hold, the key capacity over the non-authenticated
public channel will be the same as that of the case with a passive Eve, while the key capacity over the
non-authenticated channel will be zero if the simulatability condition holds. However, two questions
remain open so far: 1) For a given joint probability mass function (PMF), are there efficient algorithms
(polynomial complexity algorithms) for checking whether the simulatability condition holds or not?;
and 2) If the simulatability condition holds, are there efficient algorithms for finding the corresponding
attack strategy? In this paper, we answer these two open questions affirmatively. In particular, for a
given joint PMF, we construct a linear programming (LP) problem and show that the simulatability
condition holds if and only if the optimal value obtained from the constructed LP is zero. Furthermore,
we construct another LP and show that the minimizer of the newly constructed LP is a valid attack
strategy. Both LPs can be solved with a polynomial complexity.
Index Terms
Active adversary, Computational complexity, Farkas’ lemma, Linear programming, Non-authenticated
channel, Simulatability condition.
W. Tu and L. Lai are with Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester,
MA. Email: {wtu, llai}@wpi.edu. The work of W. Tu and L. Lai was supported by the National Science Foundation CAREER
Award under Grant CCF-1318980 and by the National Science Foundation under Grant CNS-1321223.
July 9, 2018 DRAFT
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of secret key generation via public discussion under both source and channel
models has attracted significant research interests [1]–[11]. Under the source model, users observe
correlated sources generated from a certain joint probability mass function (PMF), and can
discuss with each other via a noiseless public channel. Any discussion over the public channel
will be overheard by Eve. Furthermore, the public channel can either be authenticated or non-
authenticated. An authenticated public channel implies that Eve is a passive listener. On the other
hand, a non-authenticated public channel implies that Eve is active and can intercept, modify or
falsify any message exchanged through the public channel.
Clearly, the secret key rate that can be generated using the non-authenticated public channel
is no larger than that can be generated using the authenticated pulic channel. In [8]–[11], Maurer
and Wolf introduced a concept of simulatability condition (this condition will be defined precisely
in the sequel) and established a remarkable “all or nothing” result. In particular, they showed that
for the secret key generation via a non-authenticated public channel with two legitimate terminals
in the presence of an active adversary: 1) if the simulatability condition holds, the two legitimate
terminals will not be able to establish a secret key, and hence the key capacity is 0; and 2) if
the simulatability condition does not hold, the two legitimate terminals can establish a secret
key and furthermore the key capacity will be the same as that of the case when Eve is passive.
Intuitively speaking, if the simulatability condition holds, from its own source observations, Eve
can generate fake messages that are indistinguishable from messages generated from legitimate
users. On the other hand, if the simulatability condition does not hold, the legitimate users will
be able to detect modifications made by Eve.
It is clear that the simulatability condition is a fundamental concept for the key generation via
a non-authenticated public channel, and hence it is important to design efficient algorithms to
check whether the simulatability condition holds or not. Using ideas from mechanical models,
[10] made significant progress in designing efficient algorithms. In particular, [10] proposed
to represent PMFs as mass constellations in a coordinate, and showed that the simulatability
condition holds if and only if one mass constellation can be transformed into another mass
constellation using a finite number of basic mass operations. Furthermore, [10] introduced another
notion of one mass constellation being “more centered” than another constellation and designed a
2
low-complexity algorithm to check this “more centered” condition. For some important special
cases, which will be described precisely in Section II, [10] showed that the “more centered”
condition is necessary and sufficient for the mass constellation transformation problem (and
hence is necessary and sufficient condition for the simulatability condition for these special
cases). However, in the general case, the “more centered” condition is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the mass constellation transformation problem. Hence, whether there
exists efficient algorithms for the mass constellation transformation problem (and hence the
simulatability condition) in the general case is still an open question.
As the result, despite the significant progress made in [10], the following two questions remain
open regarding the simulatability condition for the general case:
1) For a given joint PMF, are there efficient algorithms (polynomial complexity algorithms)
for checking whether the simulatability condition holds or not?
2) If the simulatability condition holds, are there efficient algorithms for finding the corre-
sponding Eve’s attack strategy?
In this paper, we answer these two open questions affirmatively.
To answer the first open question, we construct a linear programming (LP) problem and
show that the simulatability condition holds if and only if the optimal value obtained from
this LP is zero. We establish our result in three main steps. We first show that, after some
basic transformations, checking whether the simulatability condition holds or not is equivalent
to checking whether there exists a nonnegative solution to a specially constructed system of
linear equations. We then use a basic result from linear algebra to show that whether there
exists a nonnegative solution to the constructed system of linear equations is equivalent to
whether there is a solution (not necessarily nonnegative) to a related system of inequalities or
not. Finally, we use Farkas’ lemma [12], a fundamental result in linear programming and other
optimization problems, to show that whether the system of inequalities has a solution or not
is equivalent to whether the optimal value of a specially constructed LP is zero or not. Since
there exists polynomial complexity algorithms for solving LP problems [13]–[15], we thus find
a polynomial complexity algorithm for checking the simulatability condition for a general PMF.
To answer the second open question, we construct another LP and show that the minimizer
of this LP is a valid attack strategy. The proposed approach is very flexible in the sense that one
can simply modify the cost function of the constructed LP to obtain different attack strategies.
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Furthermore, the cost function can be modified to satisfy various design criteria. For example,
a simple cost function can be constructed to minimize the amount of modifications Eve needs
to perform during the attack. All these optimization problems with different cost functions can
be solved with a polynomial complexity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce some prelim-
inaries and the problem setup. In Section III, we present our main results. In Section IV, we use
numerical examples to illustrate the proposed algorithm. In Section V, we present an approach
to further reduce the computational complexity. In Section VI, we offer our concluding remarks.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM SETUP
Let X = {1, · · · , |X |}, Y = {1, · · · , |Y|} and Z = {1, · · · , |Z|} be three finite sets. Consider
three correlated random variables (X, Y, Z), taking values from X × Y × Z , with joint PMF
PXY Z , the simulatability condition is defined as follows:
Definition 1. ( [8]) For a given PXY Z , we say X is simulatable by Z with respect to Y , denoted
by SimY (Z → X), if there exists a conditional PMF PX¯|Z such that PY X¯ = PY X , with
PY X¯(y, x) =
∑
z∈Z
PY Z(y, z) · PX¯|Z(x|z), (1)
in which PY X and PY Z are the joint PMFs of (Y,X) and (Y, Z) under PXY Z respectively.
One can also define SimX(Z → Y ) in the same manner. This concept of simulatability,
first defined in [8], is a fundamental concept in the problem of secret key generation over a
non-authenticated public channel [9]–[11], in which two terminals Alice and Bob would like
to establish a secret key in the presence of an adversary Eve. These three terminals observe
sequences XN , Y N and ZN generated according to
PXNY NZN (x
N , yN , zN ) =
N∏
i=1
PXY Z(xi, yi, zi). (2)
Alice and Bob can discuss with each other via a public non-authenticated noiseless channel,
which means that Eve not only has full access to the channel but can also interrupt, modify
and falsify messages exchanged over this public channel. The largest key rate that Alice and
Bob1 can generate with the presence of the active attacker is denoted as S∗(X ; Y ||Z). Let
1Please see [9]–[11] for precise definitions.
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S(X ; Y ||Z) denote the largest key rate that Alice and Bob can generate when Eve is passive, i.e.,
when the public channel is authenticated. Clearly, S(X ; Y ||Z) ≥ S∗(X ; Y ||Z). Although a full
characterization of S(X ; Y ||Z) is unknown in general, [9] established the following remarkable
“all or nothing” result:
Theorem 1. ( [9]) If SimY (Z → X) or SimX(Z → Y ), then S∗(X ; Y ||Z) = 0. Otherwise,
S∗(X ; Y ||Z) = S(X ; Y ||Z).
This significant result implies that, if the simulatability condition does not hold, one can
generate a key with the same rate as if Eve were passive. On the other hand, if the simulatability
condition holds, the key rate will be zero. Intuitively speaking, if SimY (Z → X) holds, then
after observing ZN , Eve can generate X¯N by passing ZN through a channel defined by PX¯|Z .
Then (X¯N , Y N) has the same statistics as (XN , Y N). Hence by knowing only Y N , Bob cannot
distinguish X¯N and XN , and hence cannot distinguish Alice or Eve.
As mentioned in the introduction, [10] has made important progress in developing low-
complexity algorithms for checking whether SimY (Z → X) (or SimX(Z → Y )) holds or not.
In particular, [10] developed an efficient algorithm to check a related condition called “more
centered” condition. When |Y| = 2, that is when Y is a binary random variable, this “more
centered” condition is shown to be necessary and sufficient for SimY (Z → X). Hence, [10] has
found an efficient algorithm to check SimY (Z → X) for the special case of Y being binary (the
algorithm is also effective in checking SimX(Z → Y ) when X is binary). However, when Y
is not binary, the “more centered” condition is only a necessary condition for SimY (Z → X).
Hence, two questions remain open:
1) For a general given PXY Z , are there efficient algorithms (polynomial complexity algo-
rithms) for checking whether SimY (Z → X) (or SimX(Z → Y )) holds or not?
2) If SimY (Z → X) (or SimX(Z → Y )) holds, are there efficient algorithms for finding the
corresponding PX¯|Z (or PY¯ |Z)?
In this paper, we answer these two open questions affirmatively.
Notations: Throughout this paper, we use boldface uppercase letters to denote matrices,
boldface lowercase letters to denote vectors. We also use 1, 0 and I, unless stated otherwise, to
denote all ones column vector, all zeros column vector and the identity matrix, respectively. In
addition, we denote the vectorization of a matrix by Vec(·). Specifically, for an m × n matrix
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A, Vec(A) is an mn× 1 column vector:
Vec(A) = [a11, · · · , am1, · · · , a1n, · · · , amn]T , (3)
in which [·]T is the transpose of the matrix. And vice versa can be done byA =Reshape(Vec(A), [m,n]).
We use A ⊗B to denote the Kronecker product of matrices A and B. Specifically, assume A
is an m× n matrix, then
A⊗B =


a11B · · · a1nB
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
am1B · · · amnB

 . (4)
All matrices and vectors in this paper are real.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this paper, we focus on SimY (Z → X). The developed algorithm can be easily modified
to check SimX(Z → Y ). We rewrite (1) in the following matrix form
C = AQ, (5)
in which C = [cij ] is a |Y| × |X | matrix with cij = PY X(i, j), A = [aik] is a |Y| × |Z| matrix
with aik = PY Z(i, k), and Q = [qkj] is a |Z| × |X | matrix with qkj = PX¯|Z(j|k) if such PX¯|Z
exists.
Checking whether SimY (Z → X) holds or not is equivalent to checking whether there exists
a transition matrix Q such that (5) holds. As Q is a transition matrix, its entries qkjs must satisfy
qkj ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ [1 : |Z|], j ∈ [1 : |X |], (6)
|X |∑
j=1
qkj = 1, ∀k ∈ [1 : |Z|]. (7)
We note that if qkjs satisfy (6) and (7), they will automatically satisfy qkj ≤ 1. Hence, we don’t
need to state this requirement here.
If there exists at least one transition matrix Q satisfying (5), (6) and (7) simultaneously, we
can conclude that the simulatability condition SimY (Z → X) holds.
(7) can be written in the matrix form
1|Z|×1 = Q1|X |×1, (8)
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Then, (5) and (8) can be written in the following compact form:
 Vec(CT )
1|Z|×1


=


a11I a12I · · · a1|Z|I
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
a|Y|1I a|Y|2I · · · a|Y||Z|I
1 0 · · · 0
0 1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 · · · 0 1


Vec(QT )
=

 A⊗ I
I|Z| ⊗ 1

Vec(QT ), (9)
in which the sizes for I, 1 and 0 are |X | × |X |, 1× |X | and 1× |X |, respectively.
For notational convenience, we define
c ,

 Vec(C
T )
1|Z|×1

 , (10)
A ,

 A⊗ I
I|Z| ⊗ 1

 , (11)
q , Vec(QT ). (12)
From (9), it is clear that c is an m× 1 vector, A is an m× n matrix, and q is an n× 1 vector,
in which
m = |Y||X |+ |Z|, (13)
n = |Z||X |. (14)
With these notation and combining (9) with (6), the original problem of checking whether
SimY (Z → X) holds or not is equivalent to checking whether there exists nonnegative solutions
q for the system
Aq = c. (15)
7
In the following, we check whether there exists at least a nonnegative solution for the system
defined by (15). There are two main steps: 1) whether the system is consistent or not; 2) if it is
consistent, whether there exists a nonnegative solution or not. Checking the consistency of (15)
is straightforward: a necessary and sufficient condition for a system of non-homogenous linear
equations to be consistent is
Rank(A) = Rank((A|c)), (16)
where (A|c) is the augmented matrix of A. If (16) is not satisfied, it can be concluded that
SimY (Z → X) does not hold. If (16) is satisfied, we need to further check whether there exists
a nonnegative solution to (15) or not.
To proceed further, we will need the following definition of generalized inverse (g-inverse) of
a matrix G.
Definition 2. ( [16]) For a given m × n real matrix G, an n ×m real matrix Gg is called a
g-inverse of G if
GGgG = G.
The g-inverse Gg is generally not unique (If n = m and G is full rank, then Gg is unique
and equal to the inverse matrix G−1). A particular choice of g-inverse is called the Moore-
Penrose pseudoinverse G+, which can be computed using multiple different approaches. One
approach is to use the singular value decomposition (SVD): by SVD, for a given G and its SVD
decomposition
G = UΣVT , (17)
then, G+ can be obtained as
G+ = VΣ+UT , (18)
in which Σ+ is obtained by taking the reciprocal of each non-zero element on the diagonal of
the diagonal matrix Σ, leaving the zeros in place. One can easily check that the Moore-Penrose
pseudoinverse G+ obtained by SVD satisfies the g-inverse matrix definition and hence is a valid
g-inverse.
With the concept of g-inverse, we are ready to state our main result regarding the first open
question.
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Theorem 2. Let Ag be any given g-inverse of A (e.g., it can be chosen as the Moore-Penrose
pseudoinverse A+), and h∗ be obtained by the following LP
h∗ = min
t
{tTAgc}, (19)
s. t. t  0,
(I− AgA)T t = 0.
Then SimY (Z → X) holds, if and only if h∗ = 0 and (16) holds.
Proof: If (16) does not hold, then there is no solution to (15), and hence SimY (Z → X)
does not hold.
In the remainder of the proof, we assume that (16) holds. If (16) holds, the general solution
to (15) can be written in the following form (see, e.g., Theorem 2 a.(d) of [17])
q = Agc+ (AgA− I)p, (20)
in which Ag can be any given g-inverse of A, and p is an arbitrary length-n vector.
As the result, the problem of whether there exists a nonnegative solution to (15) (i.e., q  0)
is equivalent to the problem of whether there exists a solution p for the following system defined
by
(I− AgA)p  Agc. (21)
To check whether the system defined by (21) has a solution, we use Farkas’ lemma, a fundamental
lemma in linear programming and related area in optimization. For completeness, we state the
form of Farkas’ lemma used in our proof in Appendix A. To use Farkas’ lemma, we first write
a LP related to the system defined in (21)
h∗ = min
t
{tTAgc},
s.t. t  0,
(I− AgA)T t = 0.
The above LP is always feasible since t = 0 is a vector that satisfies the constraints, which
results in tTAgc = 0. Hence the optimal value h∗ ≤ 0. Using Farkas’ lemma, we have that (21)
has a solution if and if h∗ = 0. More specifically, if h∗ = 0, then there exists at least a
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solution p for (21), which further implies that there is a nonnegative solution to (15), and hence
SimY (Z → X) holds. On the other hand, if h∗ < 0, then there is no solution p for (21), which
further implies that there is no nonnegative solution to (15), and hence SimY (Z → X) does not
hold.
As mentioned above, if Rank(A) = m = n holds, then Ag = A−1 is unique. For other cases,
A
g might not be unique. One may wonder whether different choices of Ag will affect the result
in Theorem 2 or not. The following proposition answers this question.
Proposition 1. Different choices of Ag will not affect the result on whether h∗ equals 0 or not.
Proof: Let Ag1 and Ag2 be two different g-inverses of A, and let h∗1 and h∗2 be the values
obtained using Ag1 and A
g
2 in (19) respectively. It suffices to show that if h∗1 = 0, then h∗2 = 0.
Assuming that h∗1 = 0, then there exists a vector p1 satisfying (I − Ag1A)p1  Ag1c, we will
show that there exists a vector p2 satisfying (I− Ag2A)p2  Ag2c, which then implies h∗2 = 0.
First, we know that Ag1c and A
g
2c are two solutions to the system Aq = c, which can be easily
verified by setting Ag as Ag1 and A
g
2 in (20) respectively and setting p = 0. This implies that
A(Ag2c− Ag1c) = 0, (22)
and hence Ag2c− Ag1c is a solution to the system Aq = 0.
Second, we know that any solution to the system Aq = 0 can be written in the form (I −
A
g
A)p [17]. As Ag2c− Ag1c is a solution to system Aq = 0, there must exist a p0 such that
(I− Ag2A)p0 = Ag2c− Ag1c. (23)
In addition, it is easy to check that (I−Ag1A)p1 + (I−Ag2A)p0 is also a solution to the system
Aq = 0. Thus, there exists a p2 such that
(I− Ag2A)p2 = (I− Ag1A)p1 + (I− Ag2A)p0. (24)
Plugging (23) into (24), we have
(I− Ag2A)p2 = (I− Ag1A)p1 + (I− Ag2A)p0
= (I− Ag1A)p1 + Ag2c− Ag1c (25)
 Ag2c, (26)
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in which the last inequality comes from the assumption that (I − Ag1A)p1  Ag1c. Hence, we
have found a p2, such that (I− Ag2A)p2  Ag2c. This implies that h∗2 = 0.
Remark 1. The proposed algorithm for checking whether SimY (Z → X) holds or not has
a polynomial complexity. Among all operations required, computing the g-inverse and solving
the LP defined by (19) require most computations. The complexity to obtain Ag is of order
O(n3) [18]. Furthermore, there exists polynomial complexity algorithms to solve the LP defined
by (19). For example, [14] provided an algorithm to solve LP using O(n3L) operations, where
L is number of binary bits needed to store input data of the problem (one can refer to Chapter
8 in [15] for more details about the complexity of algorithms for solving LP). Hence, the total
operations of our algorithm for checking SimY (Z → X) is of order O(n3L). In addition, we
note that we can terminate the LP algorithm earlier once the algorithm finds a t such that
tAgc < 0, as this indicates that h∗ < 0. This can potentially further reduce the computational
complexity.
Thus, we can conclude that the proposed algorithm can check whether SimY (Z → X) holds
or not with a polynomial complexity. Algorithm 1 summarizes the main steps involved in our
algorithm. In the following algorithm, we use Res = 0 to denote that SimY (Z → X) does not
hold and Res = 1 to denote that SimY (Z → X) holds.
In the following, we provide our answer to the second open question, i.e., if SimY (Z → X)
holds, how to find PX¯|Z efficiently.
Theorem 3. Let e be any n× 1 vector with e ≻ 0, and q∗ be the obtained from the following
LP:
min
q
f(q) = eTq, (27)
s.t. q  0,
Aq = c.
If SimY (Z → X) holds, then Q∗ = Reshape(q∗, [|X |, |Z|])T is a valid choice for PX¯|Z .
Proof: By assumption, SimY (Z → X) holds, which implies that the system defined by (15)
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Algorithm 1 Checking SimY (Z → X)
1: Input: PMF PXY Z ;
2: Initiate:
3: a. Calculate matrices A and C;
4: b. Construct c and A using (10) and (11) respectively;
5: c. Set Res = 0;
6: if (Rank(A) 6= Rank(A|c)) then
7: break;
8: else
9: d. Find a Ag, and calculate Agc, I− AgA;
10: e. Solve LP (19) and obtain h∗;
11: if (h∗ == 0) then
12: Res = 1;
13: else
14: break;
15: end if
16: end if
17: Output: Res.
is consistent and it has nonnegative solutions. Hence, the following LP is feasible
min
q
f(q) = eTq, (28)
s.t. q  0,
Aq = c,
where e ≻ 0. Hence, the minimizer q∗ is nonnegative and satisfies Aq∗ = c. We can then
reshape q∗ into matrix Q∗ (see (12)). Q∗ is a valid choice for PX¯|Z .
Remark 2. Since finding a suitable PX¯|Z using our approach is equivalent to solving a LP, the
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complexity is of polynomial order.
Remark 3. For a given distribution PXY Z , there may be more than one possible PX¯|Z such
that (1) holds. Different choices of e in (27) give different values for PX¯|Z .
Remark 4. The objective function f(q) can be further modified to satisfy various design criteria
of Eve. For example, let
q˜ = Vec(Q˜[q˜kj]T )
with q˜kj = PX|Z(k|j), then setting
f(q) = ||q− q˜||22
will minimize the amount of changes in the conditional PMF in the l2 norm sense. This is a
quadratic programming, which can still be solved efficiently.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we provide several examples to illustrate the proposed algorithm. We also use
some of the examples used in [10] to compare our proposed algorithm with the method in [10].
Example 1: Let PXY Z with ranges X = {x1, x2}, Y = {y1, y2} and Z = {z1, z2, z3} be:
PXY Z(x1, y1, z1) = 6/100,
PXY Z(x2, y1, z1) = 4/100,
PXY Z(x1, y1, z2) = 9/100,
PXY Z(x2, y1, z2) = 6/100,
PXY Z(x1, y1, z3) = 15/100,
PXY Z(x2, y1, z3) = 10/100,
PXY Z(x1, y2, z1) = 36/100,
PXY Z(x2, y2, z1) = 4/100,
PXY Z(x1, y2, z2) = 9/100,
PXY Z(x2, y2, z2) = 1/100,
PXY Z(x1, y2, z3) = 0,
PXY Z(x2, y2, z3) = 0.
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To use our algorithm, we have the following steps:
Step 1: Compute PY Z and PY X , and write them in the matrix form A and C:
A =

 0.1 0.15 0.25
0.4 0.1 0

 ,C =

 0.3 0.2
0.45 0.05

 . (29)
Step 2: Construct A and c using (10) and (11) respectively:
A =


0.1 0 0.15 0 0.25 0
0 0.1 0 0.15 0 0.25
0.4 0 0.1 0 0 0
0 0.4 0 0.1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1


, (30)
c = [0.3, 0.2, 0.45, 0.05, 1, 1, 1]T . (31)
Step 3: Check the ranks of A and (A|c):
We get
Rank(A) = Rank((A|c)) = 5. (32)
Step 4: Choose the g-inverse to be the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse A+ and calculate A+c and
I− A+A:
A
+c =


0.9762
0.0238
0.5952
0.4048
0.4524
0.5476


, (33)
I− A+A =

0.0238 −0.0238 −0.0952 0.0952 0.0476 −0.0476
−0.0238 0.0238 0.0952 −0.0952 −0.0476 0.0476
−0.0952 0.0952 0.3810 −0.3810 −0.1905 0.1905
0.0952 −0.0952 −0.3810 0.3810 0.1905 −0.1905
0.0476 −0.0476 −0.1905 −0.1905 0.0952 −0.0952
−0.0476 0.0476 0.1905 −0.1905 −0.0952 0.0952


. (34)
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Step 5: Solve LP (19). Using the above data, we obtain h∗ = 0, which implies that SimY (Z → X)
holds.
Step 6: Obtain a possible PX¯|Z . We construct the LP defined in (27) with e = [2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1]T ,
and get
q∗ = [1, 0, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2]T .
Thus the simulatability channel is
PX¯|Z =


1 0
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2

 , (35)
which is consistent with the result obtained from the criterion proposed in [10]. If we set e =
[1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]T , we get
q∗ = [0.9762, 0.0238, 0.5952, 0.4048, 0.4524, 0.5476]T,
which implies that another valid choice is
PX¯|Z =


0.9762 0.0238
0.5962 0.4048
0.4524 0.5476

 . (36)
Example 2: In this example, we consider a case in which Y is not binary. To represent the
joint PMF concisely, we follow the same approach in [10] and use
MUV = (PU(u), (PV |U=u(v1), · · · , PV |U=u(v|V|−1)))u∈U
to represent the joint PMF PUV . For this example, we set
MZY = (0.3, (0, 0)), (0.3, (0.5, 0)),
(0.3, (0.25,
√
3/4)), (0.1, (0.25,
√
3/12)),
MXY = (0.3, (0.25, 0)), (0.3, (0.375,
√
3/8)),
(0.3, (0.125,
√
3/8))(0.05, (0.24,
√
3/12))
(0.05, (0.26,
√
3/12)). (37)
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In step 1, we write PY Z and PY X in the matrix form A and C:
A =


0 0.1500 0.0750 0.0250
0 0 0.1299 0.0144
0.3000 0.1500 0.0951 0.0606

 ,
C =


0.0750 0.1125 0.0375 0.0120 0.0130
0 0.0650 0.0650 0.0072 0.0072
0.2250 0.1225 0.1975 0.0308 0.0298

 .
To make the paper concise, we do not list the values of A, c and following steps in details.
Steps 2, 3, 4 are similar to those in Example 1. But in Step 5, we obtain that h∗ < 0, which
indicates that SimY (Z → X) does not hold. This result is also consistent with the conclusion
in [10], which is obtained by an analysis that exploits the special mass constellation structure of
the data. We note that the mechanical model based “more centered” criterion in [10] does not
work for this example, as Y is not binary anymore, although the mass constellation representation
of PMFs can still be used to exploit the special structure that this set of data has.
Next, we provide an example for which the mass constellation presentation does not work
while our algorithm can easily obtain the answers.
Example 3: In this example, we consider X, Y, Z with larger dimensions, in particular, we
set |X | = 4, |Y| = 4, and |Z| = 6. Again to represent the joint PMF concisely, we use the same
method as that used in Example 2 to represent PXY Z . For this example, we randomly set
MZY =
(0.1604, (0.1966, 0.1054, 0.4198)), (0.1654, (0.1230, 0.4709, 0.3355)),
(0.1613, (0.0350, 0.6219, 0.0823)), (0.1504, (0.4585, 0.2504, 0.2343)),
(0.1207, (0.2443, 0.4704, 0.0701)), (0.2419, (0.2979, 0.1151, 0.4601));
MXY =
(0.2603, (0.1784, 0.3822, 0.2056)), (0.2181, (0.1538, 0.4409, 0.2255)),
(0.2356, (0.2129, 0.2684, 0.3913)), (0.2861, (0.3422, 0.2044, 0.3363)).
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We denote the above PMF with following two matrices
A =


0.0315 0.0203 0.0056 0.0690 0.0295 0.0720
0.0169 0.0779 0.1003 0.0377 0.0568 0.0278
0.0673 0.0555 0.0133 0.0352 0.0085 0.1113
0.0446 0.0117 0.0421 0.0085 0.0260 0.0307


,
C =


0.0464 0.0335 0.0502 0.0979
0.0995 0.0962 0.0632 0.0585
0.0535 0.0492 0.0922 0.0962
0.0609 0.0392 0.0300 0.0335


. (38)
Following the same steps as those in Example 1, we obtain that h∗ = 0, which means SimY (Z →
X) holds. Furthermore, by setting e = 124×1 in (27), we obtain one possible PX¯|Z , denoted by
matrix Q∗:
Q∗ =


0.4979 0.1504 0.2038 0.1479
0.0148 0.3751 0.5618 0.0483
0.5210 0.4391 0.0254 0.0144
0.1302 0.0917 0.0301 0.7481
0.5638 0.2674 0.0161 0.1527
0.0261 0.0622 0.4110 0.5006


. (39)
One can easily check that AQ∗ = C holds. We note that, because of the lack of special data
structure and the high dimensions, it is difficult to use the mass constellation structure of [10]
to check whether SimY (Z → X) holds or not in this example.
Example 4: In this example, we consider the following PMF PXY :
PXY (x, y) =


1−α
2
, if x = y;
α
2
, if x 6= y,
and Z is generated by [X, Y ] via an erasure channel with erasure probability 1 − γ, i.e., Z =
(X, Y ) with a probability γ and Z = φ with probability 1 − γ. It was shown in [10] that
simY (Z → X) and simX(Z → Y ) hold if and only if γ ≥ 1− 2α. In the following, we use our
algorithm to verify the obtained result.
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As above, in step 1, we compute PY Z and write PY Z and PY X in matrix form A and C:
A =


(1−α)γ
2
αγ
2
0 0 1−γ
2
0 0 αγ
2
(1−α)γ
2
1−γ
2

 ,
C =


1−α
2
α
2
α
2
1−α
2

 .
In step 2, we calculate matrices A and c:
A =

(1−α)γ
2
0 αγ
2
0 0 0 0 0 1−γ
2
0
0 (1−α)γ
2
0 αγ
2
0 0 0 0 0 1−γ
2
0 0 0 0 αγ
2
0 (1−α)γ
2
0 1−γ
2
0
0 0 0 0 0 αγ
2
0 (1−α)γ
2
0 1−γ
2
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1


,
c = [1− α, α, α, 1− α, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]T .
The following steps are similar to those in Examples 1 and 2. Using our algorithm, we can
find that, for any given values α and γ, as long as γ ≥ 1 − 2α, h∗ = 0, and the simulatability
condition holds. We can also obtain a possible simulatability channel PX¯|Z that Eve may use,
following the same steps as in Example 1. On the other side, if γ < 1−2α, we obtained h∗ < 0,
and hence the simulatability condition does not hold.
V. COMPLEXITY REDUCTION
In Proposition 1, we show that different choices of Ag will not affect the result on whether
h∗ equals zero or not. However, different choices of Ag may affect the amount of computation
needed. Primal-dual path-following method is one of the best methods for solving LP of the
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following form [15]:
min
t
tTb
s.t. t  0,
Bt = d,
in which B is a matrix of size m× n. The complexity is related to the size of B. In particular,
in terms of m and n, the complexity is O((nm2+n1.5m)L) [19], [20]. In LP (19) constructed in
the proof of Theorem 2, B = (I−AgA)T , which is an n× n matrix, and hence the complexity
is O(n3L) as mentioned in Section III.
In the following, we show that if we choose the g-inverse of A to be A+, the Moore-Penrose
inverse, the problem size can be reduced by some further transformations. Let the SVD of A be
UΣVT . Then A+ = VΣ+UT . Suppose rank(Σm×n) = r and set s = n− r.We have
A
+
A = VΣ+UTUΣVT
= V

 Ir 0r×s
0s×r 0s×s

VT . (40)
As discussed in the proof of Theorem 2, checking SimY (Z → X) holds or not is equivalent
to checking whether
(I− A+A)p  A+c (41)
has a solution or not. We now perform some transformations on (41). First we have
I− A+A = V

 Ir0r×s
0s×r Is

VT −V

 Ir 0r×s
0s×r0s×s

VT
= V

 0r×r 0r×s
0s×r Is

VT . (42)
Hence, (41) is equivalent to
V

 0r×r 0r×s
0s×r Is

VTp  A+c. (43)
V can be split into four blocks as
V =

 Vr×r Vr×s
Vs×r Vs×s

 . (44)
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We use w to denote the n× 1 column vector VTp, i.e.,
w = VTp. (45)
Note that p↔ w is a reversible bijection, since VT is a full rank matrix.
Then (43) is equivalent to 
 0r×r Vr×s
0s×r Vs×s



 wr×1
ws×1

  A+c, (46)
which is equivalent to 
 Vr×s
Vs×s

[ ws×1
]
 A+c. (47)
Hence, checking whether (41) has a solution or not is equivalent to checking whether (47) has a
solution or not. To check whether (47) has a solution or not, we can construct a new LP for (47)
in the same way as in the proof in Theorem 2. However, the size of the newly constructed LP
will be smaller than that of (19) constructed in the proof of Theorem 2. The complexity for
the newly constructed LP will be O((ns2 + n1.5s)L). Since s is always less than or equal to n
(sometimes, s can be much less than n) and that L doesn’t change, compared with the LP (19),
the computational complexity for this new LP will be reduced.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed an efficient algorithm to check the simulatability condition,
an important condition in the problems of secret key generation using a non-authenticated public
channel. We have also proposed a simple and flexible method to calculate a possible simulata-
bility channel if the simulatability condition holds. The proposed algorithms have polynomial
complexities. We have presented numerical examples to show the efficiency of the protocol.
Finally, we have proposed an approach to further reduce the computational complexity.
APPENDIX A
FARKAS’ LEMMA
There are several equivalent forms of the Farkas’ lemma [12]. Here, we state a form that will
be used in our proof.
Lemma 1. (Farkas’ Lemma [12]) Let B be a matrix, and b be a vector, then the system specified
by Bp  b, has a solution p, if and only if tTb ≥ 0 for each column vector t  0 with BTt = 0.
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